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470 PEOPLE tI. THOMAS [41C.2d 
{Crim. No. 5375. In Bank. Sept. 18, 1953.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EVAN CHARLES THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicid~Instructions-.:-Murder.-It is proper to instruct jury 
that murder which is perpetrated by lying in wait is declared 
by law to be first degree murder and that, if jury should find 
that defendant committed that crime, it will have no choice 
but to designate offense as first degree murder. 
[2] ld.-Murder in First Degre~Killing by Lying in Wait.-
Where a murder is shown to have been committed by "lying 
in wait," a showing of specific intent is unnecessary to fix the 
degree, such offense having been designated as first degree mur-
der by Pen. Code, § 189. 
[3] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
An instruction in a murder case that "Where the killing is by 
'lying in wait,' and the act causing death was intentional, it 
is murder of the first degree whether the killing was intentional 
or unintentional," while not as exact as it might be, did not 
result in prejudice to defendant where it was contained in a 
definition of the expression ''lying in wait," in which the court 
correctly set forth physical aspects of the act, where court 
made it sufficiently clear that act of lying in wait alone did 
not constitute the crime but that when murder had been estab-
lished and was found to have been committed by lying in wait 
as that act was defined in instruction the law fixes the degree 
of the crime, where considering instructions as a whole it was 
clear'that court's reference to a "killing" was reasonably under-
stood by jury to be a killing which constituted murder., and 
where court had fully and correctly instructed jury on dis-
tinction between first and second degree murder. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Charles W. Fricke, 
Judge. Affirmed. . 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of 1lrst 
degree murder, affirmed. 
[2] See Oal • .Tur., Homicide, § 12 et seq.; Am • .Tur., Homicide, 
1§15,16. 
KcK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, 1185; [2] Homicide, 
115(5); [3] Homicide, 1267. 
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Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
SHENK, J .-The defendant was found guilty of murder 
in the first degree without recommendation. The victim was 
Nina Marie Bice. A motion for a new trial was denied and 
the extreme penalty was imposed. On this appeal, automati-
cally taken under Penal Code, section 1239 (b), the sole con-
tention of the defendant is that the court misdirected the jury 
by giving an improper instruction on "lying in wait," here-
inafter quoted in full. 
The defendant was charged by information in count I that 
on or about August 29, 1951, he wilfully, unlawfully, felo-
niously and with malice aforethought murdered Nina Marie 
Bice. In counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X and XII he was charged 
with the attempted murder of each of several persons he shot 
at but failed to kill. In counts III, V, VII, IX, XI, and 
XIII he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon on 
each of those same persons. The defendant pleaded not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity to each of the 13 counts. 
At the commencement of the trial the prosecution moved for 
a severance of count I from all the other counts. The defense 
agreed to the severance and the motion was granted. There-
upon the defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity as to count 1. Following the conviction on count 
I the other counts were ordered off calendar. 
The .facts of this cas~ are not in dispute. In the evening of 
April 15, 1952, the defendant paid a social call on a neighbor-
hood woman in Los Angeles County. He left at approximately 
10 p.m., and shortly thereafter a shot was fired through the 
front window of the woman's home, injuring no one. Upon 
questioning by the sheriff's deputies the following day, the 
defendant admitted he fired the shpt. A stenographic state-
ment was taken at this time. In the statement the defendant 
related the following additional shootings: 
On August 27, 1951, he shot at his first victim, a woman 
waiting at a corner telephone booth at about 10 :30 in the 
morning. The bullet entered below the left shoulder blade. 
Following surgery she recovered from the wound. On August 
28, 1951, he shot through the front window of a home, injuring 
no one. 
On August 29, 1951, between 10 and 10 :30 p.m. he shot and 
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killed Mrs. Nina Marie Bice. She was sitting on a stool next 
to the counter of a sman lunch stand located at 1021 Atlantic 
Boulevard in Los Angeles County. The defendant st~ted that 
he noticed her as he drove by on his way to work; that be 
drove down an al1ey and stopped at a distance of about 200 
feet from the lunch counter; that he took a .22 caliber rifle 
from under the back seat of his car; that he shot once at the 
woman, trying to knock a coffee cup out of her hands; that 
he saw her slump over the counter, and that he started his 
car and drove past the lunch counter where the victim had 
been laid out on the ground. The bullet entered the deceased's 
right ear killing her immediately. 
On October 16, 1951, at 8 0 'clock in the morning, the defend-
ant shot at an ll-year-old schoolgirl, standing on a corner 
waiting for a bus. The bullet shattered a bone in the girl's 
forearm. 
On November 23, 1951, at about 9 :30 in the morning the 
defendant shot at a woman working in her yard with her son 
and daughter and three of their friends. The bullet entered 
her right thigh and was removed by surgery. 
On December 25, 1951, at about 10 :30 in the evening the 
defendant shot through a window at a woman ironing in her 
home. The bullet entered her abdominal cavity and lodged 
in a position where it was too hazardous to be removed. 
With the exception of t.he final shooting, the defendant 
stated that he was acquainted with none of the women at 
whom he shot or at whose homes he shot. He purchased the 
.22 caliber rifle, used in each instance, in July, 1951, and car-
ried it under the rear seat of his automobile. [n some eases 
he shot from the automobile, and in others from outside of 
it. The only reason given for the shootings was that in some 
of the eases he experienced a sexual satisfaction while in the 
commission of the act or shortly thereafter. 
On April 17, 1952, a sworn statement was taken from the 
defendant in the office of the district attorney. The statement 
was substantially the same as that taken by the sheriff's dep-
uties the previous day and recited the same facts, although 
in greater detail than above related. Again the defendant· 
gave no motive, other than the sexual satisfaction heexpe-
rienced. 
At the trial the two statements made by the defendant were 
read into the record. The victims, with the exception of the 
deceased, tt'stified as to the shootings and other witnesses 
testified as to the shooting of the deceased. There was ex-
.I 
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ptlrt testimony to the effect that the defendant, a married 
man, led a frustrated sexual life at home and the shoot-
ings were an outlet for his sexual drive in his particular case. 
Expert opinion as to the defendant's mental ability varied 
from "subnormal" to "above average." The only testimony 
given by the defendant was that be bad been in an automo-
bile accident in 1948 and was rendered unconscious for six 
bours, and that during the remainder of the year 1948 he 
suffered headaches. The court ruled that this did not open 
up to cross-examination the entire field of the defendant's 
conduct. The defendant was not examined in court as to 
the commission of the acts charged against him. 
The defendant contends that because there is no proof that 
he had intent to kill, a properly instructed jury would have 
returned a "erdict of murder of the second degree. Section 
189 of the Penal Code reads as follows: "All murder which 
is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, 
or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any 
act punisbable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree; 
and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree." The 
section purports to set forth tbe degree of a crime previously 
determined to be "murder." "Murder is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being, witb malice aforethought." (Pen. 
Code, § 187.) 
[1] The court correctly instructed the jury on murder 
by lying in wait as follows: "-
"Murder which is perpetrated by lying in wait is declared 
by our law to be murder of the first degree, and if you should 
find that the defendant committed that crime, you will have 
no choice but to designate the offense as murder in the first 
degree. " 
The defendant brings into question the further instruction 
of the court defining "lying in wait": 
"The words 'lying in wait' do not refer to the position of 
the body of the person who commits a killing. There may 
be a 'lying in wait' within the meaning of the law where such 
person is sitting down, standing or to a degree moving about. 
The gist of 'lying in wait' is that the person places himself 
in a position where he is waiting and watching and concealed 
from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily 
injury upon such p(>r~on or of killing such person. There 
is nothing in the law that requires that the 'lying in wait' 
./ 
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exist for or consume any particular period of time before 
the firing of a shot or other act which caused the death. It 
is only necessary that the act causing death be preceded by 
and the outgrowth of the 'lying in wait.' 
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait,' and the act caus-
ing death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree, 
whether the killing was intentional or unintentional, as in 
such case it is not necessary that there exist in the mind 
of the perpetrator an intent to kill." 
The defendant contends that the instruction was improper 
because it permitted the jury to convict of first degree murder 
where there was no evidence of a specific intent to kill. 
[2] But where a murder is shown to have been committed 
by 'lying in wait' a showing of intent is unnecessary to fix 
the degree. In People v. Bernard, 28 Ca1.2d 207, it is stated 
at page 211 [169 P.2d 636]: " ... the murderer who kills 
by torture or poison may intend only to inflict suf£ering, 
not death. Evidence of the means used might support an 
inference that the killing was willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated, but where the jury has found that the killing was 
by poison, lying in wait, or torture it is not their [the jury '8] 
function to go farther and draw inferences as to the manner 
of the formation and carrying out of an intention to kill. In 
such a case the question which the statute (Pen. Code, § 189) 
answers affirmatively is not 4 Is the killing willful, deliberate 
and premeditated "; it is, 'Is the killing murder of the first 
degree" Killings by the means or on the occasions under 
discussion are murders of the first degree because of the sub-
stantive statutory definition of the crime." (See, also, People 
v. Tuthill, 31 Ca1.2d 92,99 [187 P.2d 16].) 
The defendant relies upon an excerpt from People v. How-
ard (1930), 211 Cal. 322,329 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385], 
where it is stated: "To be murder of the first degree, under 
our statute, the killing must be premeditated except when 
done in the perpetration of certain felonies; that is to say, 
the unlawful killing must be accompanied with a deliberate 
and clear intent to take life." In that case the deceased died 
from a blow on the head received in the course of a struggle 
following an argument with the defendant. It was held that 
the evidence did not show that the murder was wilful and 
deliberate. The question of murder by lying in wait was not 
in issue, and the statement of the court cannot fairly be con-
strued to mean that where a murder by lying in wait is com-
mitted it cannot be murder of the first degree unless accom-
panied by proof of a specific intent to kill. 
) 
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[3] Ai; above noted the court instructed the jury that 
ccWhcre the killing is by 'lying in wait,' and the act causing 
death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree whether 
the killing was intentional or unintentional. ... " It is 
contended that this is not a complete statement of the law; 
that under such an instruction one could be comicted of 
murder of the first degree where by lying in wait he sought 
merely to playa prank upon the deceased but instead created 
circumstances which caused death, and that the instruction 
ignores the provisions of the Penal Code which presuppose 
that a "murder" as distinguished from a "killing" has been 
committed, in which event it is of the first degree if perpe-
trated by lying in wait. 
It may be assumed that the instruction standing alone is 
not as exact as it might be. Still no prejudice to the defend-
ant resulted therefrom. It was contained in a definition of 
the expression "lying in wait." Therein the court correctly 
set forth the physical aspects of the act. It made it sufficiently 
clear that the act of lying in wait alone did not constitute 
the crime but that when murder had been established and was 
found to have been committed by lying in wait as that act 
was defined in the instruction the law fixes the degree of the 
crime. Considering the instructions as a whole it is clear 
that when the court made reference to a "killing" it was 
reasonably understood by the members of the jury to be a kilb. 
ing which constituted murder. The court had fully and cor-
rectly instructed the jury on the distinction between first and 
second degree murder and on all aspects of the law applicable 
to the facts including intent and how it could be manifested 
and proved. It had instructed that "you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruc-
tion, and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole, and are to regard each in the light 
of all the others." 
The defendant was convicted on undisputed evidence. He 
had a full and a fair trial. No reason' has been ad~ced 
which would justify a reversal. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur, but wish to amplify the reasons 
for my concurrence. 
Two basic questions are presented On tbis appeal: (1) Was 
-) 
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the instruction on lying in wait erroneous f (2) Was the 
evidence insufficient to warrant the giving of an instruction 
on lying in wait' 
The instruction on Jying in wait] was erroneous in stating, 
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait', and the act causing 
death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether 
the killing was intentional or unintentional, as in such cast> 
it is not necessary that there exist in the mind of the . per-
petrator an intent to kill. " 
A "killing" by means of Jying in wait is not murder of 
the first degree unless it is first establishp,d that it is murder. 
Only then can the question arise whether it is murder of the 
first degree because perpetrated by lying in wait. Under 
the instruction given an unintentional killing that did not 
amount to murder would nevertheless be murder of the first 
degree. This error is fundamental. 
The following statutory definitions of murder, malice afore-
thought, and first degree murder must first be carefully 
considered. 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with 
malice aforethought." (Pen. Code, § 187.) 
.. Such malice may be express or implied. It is express 
when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully 
to take away the life of a fellow-creature. It is implied, when 
DO considerable provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned and malig-
nant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.) 
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or 
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, de-
liberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed 
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson. rape, 
robbery. burglary. mayhem. or any act punishable under 
... ·The words 'lying in wait' do not refer to the position of the bod)' 
of the person who commits a killing. There ma)' be a 'l),ing in wait' 
withiJI the meaning of the law where such person is sitting down, stand-
ing or to a degree moving about. The gist of 'lying in wait' is that 
the person place himself in a position where be is waiting and watching 
and concealed from the person killed with the intention of inflicting 
bodiJ)' injur)' upon such person or of killing such person. There is 
nothing in the law that requires that the 'lying in wait' enst for or 
consume any particular period of time before the firing of a shot or other 
act which caused the death. It is only necessar)' that the act causing 
death be preceded by and the outgrowth of the 'l)'iJIg in wait.' 
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait,' and the act (lausing death was 
intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether the killing was in· 
tentional or unintelltional, as in !luch case it i8 Dot necessary that there 
uiBt in the mind of the perpetrator an intent to 1Wl." 
I 
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Section 288 [lewd or lascivious act against a child], is murder 
of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the 
second degree. ,. (Pen. Code, § 189.) 
Section 189 does not state that a "killing" perpetrated 
by one of the enumerated means is murder of the first degree. 
It speaks only of "murder" that is so perpetrated. In People 
v. Ooefield. 37 Ca1.2d 865 (236 P.2d 570], the defendant, who 
had been. convicted of murder of the first degree for a 
killing committed in the perpetration of a robbery, pointed 
out that" murder" is the grammatical antecedent of "which" 
in the clause •• which is committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate . . . robbery," and contended that 
the killing was accidental and was therefore not with malice 
aforethought and was therefore not •• murder" committed 
in the perpetration of a robbery, and accordingly was not 
murder of the first degree. We rejected this contention, hold· 
ing not only that "malice is shown by the nature of th(> 
attempted crime, and the law fixes upon the offender the 
intent which makes any killing in the perpetration of or 
attempt to perpetrate the robbery a murder of the first 
degree" but that "in such a case the jury had no option but 
to return a verdict of murder of the first degree, whether 
the killing was done intentionally or accidentally." (37 
CaUd at 868. S69.) It is contended that since the poisonirig "-
or torturing of another or lying in wait to take him unawares 
involves substantial risk to human life. malice should also 
be found in the nature of such acts. and that a killing reo 
suIting therefrom should likewisp be held to be murder of 
the first degree whether it was done' intentionally or acci· 
dentally. Section 189, however, when read in the light of other 
sections of the Penal Code and the dp.cisions of this colirt, is 
not amenable to that construction. 
By the use of the phrase ., or any other kind of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing" (italics added) fol-
lowing the phrase .. All murder which is perpetrated by 
means of poison, or lying in wait, torture,'" the Legislature 
identified murder committed by any of the enumerated means 
as a "kind of" willful, deliberate, and pr('meditated killing. 
Ordinarily, to prove that a killing '\1'as willful, deliberat.e. 
and premeditated, evidence must be introduced from which 
the trier of fact can determine the state of mind of the de-
fendant before he committed the act that resulted in his 
victim's death, that is, whether the killing resulted from a 
deliberate intention to take human life. 
I 
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If the ldlling is murder within the meaning of Penal Code, 
sections 187 and 188, and is by one of the means enumerated 
in section 189, the use of such means makes the killing as a 
matter of law the equivalent of "a willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing." Since any question as to the de-
fendant's willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation is taken 
from the trier of fact by force of the statute (PeopZe v. 
Bernard, 28 Ca1.2d 207, 211 [169 P.2d 636] ; People v. Murphy, 
1 Cal.2d 37,41 [32 P.2d 635] ; see, also, the illuminating dis-
cussion in the early case of Riley v. State (1849), 28 Tenn. 
646, 660-661), it bears emphasis that a "killing" by one of 
the three means enumerated in the statute is not the equivalent 
of a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" unless 
it is first established that it is murder. Thus, if it is contended 
that a murder was committed by means of poison, it is not 
enough to show that a poison was administered and that a 
death resulted. If the poison was innocently given under the 
belief that it was a harmles drug and that no serious results 
would follow, there would be no malice, express or implied, 
and any resulting death would not be murder. (PeopZe v. 
Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 170-171 [78 P. 549].) If, however, the 
defendant administered poison to his victim for an evil pur-
pose, so that malice aforethought is shown, it is no defense 
that he did not intend or expect the death of his victim. 
(People v. Cobler, 2 Cal.App.2d 375, 380 [37 P.2d 869] ; see 
People v. Bernard. supra, 28 Ca1.2d 207, 211.) Similarly, 
in the case of a killing by torture, it is not enough to show 
that the killing was by a means that incidentally caused pain 
a!ld suffering to the victim. (People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 
164,177-178 [163 P.2d 8].) It must be established that the 
defendant intended to "cause cruel suffering on the part of 
the object of the attack either for the purpose of revenge, 
extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward pro-
pensity." (People v. Tubb", 34 Ca1.2d 72. 77 r207 P.2d 511 ; 
People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 886 [256 P.2d 911]; 
P~ople v. Martinez, 38 Ca1.2d 556, 561 [241 P.2d 224].) The 
defendant need not intend that his victim die as a result of 
the torture, since his intention to commit acts that involve a 
substantial risk to human life makes him guilty of first degree 
murder if a death results. (People v. Tubby, supra, 34 Cal. 
2d 72, 77.) 
When it is contended that a killing is murder of the first 
degrN' on tlH' ground that it was committed by lying in wait, 
it must likewise first be established that the killing was 
./ 
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murder.2 If the killing was not murder, it cannot be first 
degree murder, and it is immaterial that the defendant was 
lying in wait. Otherwise. absurd results might follow. Thus, 
a defendant might lie in wait to frighten a person. Unknown 
to defendant, that person might have a defective heart. His 
death from a heart attack as a result of the fright would not 
be murder. Again, a killing that unintentionally results from 
a fist fight is ordinarily involuntary manslaughter. (People 
v. Le Grant, 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [172 P.2d 554] ; People 
v. Miller, 114 Cal.App. 293, 301 [299 P. 742].) If the de· 
fendant lay in wait for his victim to engage in a fist fight 
with him and the victim dies as a result of the fight, that 
fact alone is not sufficient to make it the equivalent of a 
,. willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." 
The instruction was also erroneous in stating that defendant 
was lying in wait if he was "waiting and watching and 
concealed from the person killed with the intention of in-
flicting bodily injury upon such person or of killing such 
person." When read with the last paragraph of the instruc-
tion, the foregoing language directed the jury to find de-
fendant guilty of first degree murder if he intended "bodil;y 
injury. " That definition falls short of the definition of' 
murder in sections 187 and 188 of the Penal Code. It is 
true that murder may be committed without a specific intent 
to take human life if the killing is committed under circum-
stances that show an abandoned and malignant heart. To 
be so committed, however, the defendant must intend to 
commit acts that are likely to cause death and that show a 
conscious disregard for human life. (See People v. Torres, 
94 Cal.App.2d 146, 150 [210 P.2d 324) [striking victim with 
knife] ; People v. Semone, 140 Cal.App. 318, 324 [35 P.2d 
379] [firing shotgun at trespassers]; People v. Hubbard, 
64 Cal.App. 27, 37 [220 P. 315] [shooting with intent only 
to wound]; People v. Stein, 23 Cal.App. 108, 114 [137 P. 
271] [firing shots at random into crowded dance hall].) As 
we have seen in considering the first error discussed above, 
a mere intent to inflict "bodily injury," amounting to an as-
'In the California eases involving murder by lying in wait, there was 
no contention that the killing was not murder; the only question was 
whether it was of the first or second degree. (People v. Bernard, 28 
Cal.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636] [victim struck with deadly weapon]; People 
v. Tuthill, 81 Cal.2d 92 [187 P.2d 16] (victim shot with intent to kill]; 
People v. Yukich, 201 Cal. 290 [257 P. 46] [same]; People v. Mile8, 55 
Cal. 207 [same]; People v. GibBon, 92 Cal.App.2d 55 (206 P.2d 375] 
[victim stabbed].) 
, 
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sault and battery at most, would not be enongll to constItute 
murder if a killing resulted therefrom. 
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the 
instruction on lying in wait was defective largely beeatlse 
the court failed to explnin that murder must first be established 
before the question of lying in ,Yait can arise. 'Without such 
an explanation the instrnction was not only misleading but 
a gross misstatement of the law. We ,,"ould be compe]]ed 
to hold that the instruction was prejudicial and resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice, if there was evidence in the record 
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the killing 
was not murder. There is no such evidence. 
Defendant confessed that he shot at Mrs. Bice for sexual 
pleasure. In one statement he said that she "had her 
coffee cup in her hand getting ready to drink her coffee which 
was what I was really aiming at ... she had it right in 
front of her face." In another statement he said that he 
simply "aimed at the woman in the stand, and pulled the 
trigger and drove off." He said that he knew he was a poor 
shot. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt t1lat 
malice must be implied and that the killing was murder. An 
intent to kill is not necessary for murder. Malice is implied 
"when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.) That 
is shown when, as here. the defendant for a base, antisocial 
motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an . 
act that involves a high degree of probability that it wi]] result 
in death. By his own admissions defendant's conduct demon-
strates that he was not averse to endangering life for the 
sake of the sexual pleasure it gave him. Only a person with 
an "abandoned and malignant heart" could value the at-
tainment of that pleasure more highly than human life. Since 
even if a proper instruction had been given, the jury could 
have come to no other conclusion than that the killing of Mrs. 
Bice was murder, the instruction did not result in a mis-
carriage of justice unless there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant the giving of any instruction on 13-';ng in wait. 
We thus reach the crucial issue in this case: Was the 
evidence sufficient to warrant the giving of an instruction 
on lying in wait t 
Lying in wait requires the elements of waiting, vtatching, 
and concealment for the purpose of taking a victim unawares. 
(People v. Tuthill, 31 Ca1.2d 92, 100-101 [187 P.2d 16J; 
Barnards v. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 227 [12 S.W. 431].) It 
/ 
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does not mean thai. t.he defendant's body must be in a lying 
position; it is immllt.'rial whetber be is lying, sitting, stand-
ing, or moving abou~ .. so long as tbe elements of waiting, 
watching, and concealment are all present for tbe purpose 
of taking tbe victim unawares. (People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 
459, 468 [61 N.W. 861j ; .State v. Walke,., 170 N.C. 716, 718 
[86 S.E. 1055].) Tbe defendant may eitber wait for his 
victim to come to his place of biding Dr he may go to a 
hiding plaee near bis victim and wait for a favorable moment 
to murder bim. (People v. Repke, supra, 103 Mich. 459, 468.) 
Tbe duration of tbe waiting, watching, and concealment 
necessary to constitute lying in wait cannot be arbitrarily 
fixed in units of time, just as tbe time necessary for tbe 
ordinary willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing cannot 
be so fixed. There must, however, be substantial evidence 
of a long enougb period of waiting and watching in conceal-
ment to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation 
and deliberation before the court can properly give an in-
struction on lying in wait. It is now settled that a mere 
specific intent to kill is not enougb to constitute first degree 
murder under tbe classification of •• any other kind of willful, 
. deliberate, and premeditated killing," and tbat there must be 
substantial evidence that the intent to kill was arrived at 
as a result of premeditation and deliberation. (Peoplev. 
Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 90-91 [152 P.2d21] ; People v. Thomas, 
25 Ca1.2d 880, 901 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Honeycutt, 29 
CaI.2d 52, 61 l172 P.2d 698] ; People v. Valentine, 28 Ca1.2d 
121, 131 [169 P.2d 1].) If it is claimed that the murder was 
by one of the means enumernted in section 189, tbere must 
also be substantial evidence of tbe use of such means. Tbus 
in tbe case of murder by lying in wait it is not enough that 
the victim be unaware of the pi.'esence of his assailant until the 
fatal wound is inflicted. It is also necessary that there be 
substantial evidence of the elements of waiting and watcbing. 
Otherwise a killing that was tbtl result of a rash impulse would 
be converted into first degree murder. 
In my opinion if the only evidence in this case was that 
with' respect to the murder of !lrs. Bice, it would not be 
sufficient to sustain a finding of murder by means of lying 
in wait. Defendant saw deceased, a stranger to him, as be 
drove by in his automobile. He then drove around the block 
and parked in an alley in a position from which he could 
.shoot at her. Standing alone, tbis evidence supplies no clue 
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as to whether defendant was waiting and watching for an 
opportunity to shoot at any victim who might present herself. 
or formed the intent to shoot only after the opportunity 
presented itself. Moreover, the fact that after seeing bi!> 
victim, he drove round the block and parked in a position 
from which he could shoot. is not. when considered by itself, 
evidence of lying in wait. His victim was then at hand. He 
did not drive round the block into the alley to watch and 
wait for her but only to enable him to shoot her. Any delay 
in doing so after he bad located his victim in an exposed 
position would not contribute to his success in executing his 
crime, but only increase the possibility that his victim might 
escape by moving from the area of danger. Thus unless de-
fendant was watching and waiting for his victim before hc 
came upon her, the murder was not committed by means of 
lying in wait. 
The shooting of Mrs. Bice was not an isolated incident. On 
six other occasions defendant shot at women under similar 
circumstances. He carried his rifle with him in his automobile. 
His only motive for the shootings was sexual gratification. 
From this evidence the jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant drove about the city waiting and watching for what-
ever victims might present themselves. They could infer 
that he was waiting and watching for a victim on the night 
when he murdered decedent. Since in addition the murder 
was committed from a position of concealment, all of the 
elements necessary to constitute murder committed by means 
of lying in wait were present, and it was not error to present 
that theory to the jury. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. 
Excepting his final conclusions, I agree with and adopt 
Justice Traynor's discussion and statement of the law as 
expressed in his concurring opinion. I do not agree that 
the evidence shows murder by lying in wait. 
Furthermore, even if we accept the theory of lying in wait 
advanced in Justice Traynor's opinion, I do not believe the 
judgment of first degree murder can properly be sustained. 
It should not be sustained because no instruction so defining 
lying in wait was given to the jury and the record therefore 
fails to show-indeed it indwates the contrary-that the jury 
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ever passed on the issues and found the facts essential to 
support the verdict on the theory described. 
The evidence is ample to establish murder in the second 
degree and in my view both the law and justice would be 
better served by reducing the judgment of conviction to 
murder of the second degree and, as so reduced, affirming it. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to support a 
judgment of murder of the first degree. The judgment 
cannot be sustained on the theory of lying in wait as the evi-
dence falls far short of establishing this ground and the jury 
was not instructed on the law applicable thereto. The evi-
dence is sufficient to support a judgment of murder of the 
second degree and I would modify the judgment accordingly 
and affirm it as so modified. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
15, 1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
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